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Social Solidarity for All? 
Trade Union Strategies, Labour Market Dualisation and the Welfare State in Italy and South Korea 
 
Labour markets across the OECD world have been under enormous pressure, and we observe rising 
social polarisation with the decline of stable, well-remunerated standard employment and the explo-
sion of irregular and precarious jobs at the ever growing margins of labour markets. Globalisation and 
increasingly aggressive employer strategies have been identified as key drivers of labour market dual-
isation, but also governments’ labour market deregulation across the OECD (typically responding to 
business lobbying) allowed employers to change their employment practices.1 These developments 
pose fundamental challenges to trade unions, which have typically built their industrial and political 
strategies around the assumption of standard employment – not only as a social reality but also as a 
normative goal.  
 The new political-economic “mainstream” considers trade unions as being “complicit” in la-
bour market dualisation arguing that organised labour does not only prioritise insider interests at the 
expense of irregular workers, but also enters producer coalitions with employers to secure the privi-
leged position of insiders, the core of their membership. In other words, insider/outsider and producer 
coalition theories assume that trade unions are ready to support the greater use of precarious workers 
if this stabilises core workforces.2 This literature calls into question traditional political-economic re-
search that assumes organised labour as the genuine interest representation of the entire working 
class.3 Although insider/outsider theory has rightly pointed out that it has become increasingly diffi-
cult to assume one class interest with the successive differentiation of labour market positions, it 
merely perceives unions, based on rational choice assumptions, as an interest organisation of insiders, 
essentially reducing trade unions to business unionism. However, with reference to Hyman’s seminal 
work,4 recent contributions have highlighted cross-national diversity of trade unions’ responses to la-
bour market dualisation, underlining how unions’ historical identities and institutional structures 
shape organised labour’s strategies towards new challenges.5 
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 Whilst our analysis of the Italian and South Korean cases confirms the importance of union 
identity and structure, and thereby contributes to the emerging body of literature challenging in-
sider/outsider and producer coalition approaches, we also show how the perception of fundamental 
socio-economic and socio-political crises made organised labour call into question historically estab-
lished trade union identities and corresponding industrial relations and political strategies. Critically, 
we do not only observe changes in the industrial relations arena with unions displaying greater inclu-
siveness towards outsiders, but also a politicisation of union agency with organised labour more pro-
actively engaging in social and labour market policy-making in order to protect both insiders and out-
siders. Historically, Italian class unionism was preoccupied with the workplace and did not ascribe 
much importance to the universalisation of welfare, as wage increases and contributory social insur-
ance, of primary benefit to insiders (notably old-age pensions), were considered the main source for 
improving the living standards of the working class. In Korea, we also find union preoccupation with 
the workplace but rooted in business unionism, which considers unions a purely economic agency. 
However, in the face of dualisation and associated challenges to organised labour, in both Italy and 
Korea, we show trade unions’ deliberate strategies to open up their organisations to outsiders and to 
reinvent the movement by engaging and forming new coalitions with other civil society organisations 
for greater, universal public social welfare. In recognition of the limits of their historical organising 
models, labour movements in the two countries have, in other words, converged towards a new 
model of social unionism – understood as the development of solidaristic policies beyond their “tra-
ditional” constituencies (i.e. permanent workers) and domain of action (i.e. the workplace). 
Methodologically, these observations in Italy and Korea are particularly intriguing, as unions 
in both countries are commonly perceived as conservative forces that have been struggling with com-
ing to terms with fast changing labour markets.6 Still, Italian unions are typically seen as being caught 
up in past class struggles,7 whereas Korean enterprise unions are commonly viewed as pursuing some 
of the most particularistic strategies.8 However, contrary to the image of conservative forces, we show, 
with a most-different research design, unions’ capacity to “innovate” and develop strategies that aim 
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not only at confronting the secular process of dualisation but also at increasing inclusiveness towards 
labour market outsiders in two critical cases,9 where the historical predominance of workplace soli-
darity (based on strong class and business unionism, respectively) should be expected to present par-
ticularly high barriers towards greater inclusiveness and “solidarity for all” (especially if compared the 
inclusive social unionism of Scandinavian countries with Ghent systems, where trade unions run un-
employment protection with the result of high union density including greater representation of out-
siders). In our analysis, we distinguish between trade unions strategies in the workplace (that is, the 
industrial relations dimension) and their positions with regard to employment and social protection 
(especially, the inclusiveness with regard to labour market outsiders; that is, the public policy dimen-
sion). Empirically, in addition to trade union documents, the article rests upon 28 semi-structured 
interviews with labour activists and experts in the two countries. Trade unionists are drawn from dif-
ferent confederations and industrial unions to gain an in-depth understanding of the preferences and 
strategies across the labour movement in both countries.  
 
Trade Unions under Siege: Between “Old Battles” and Modernisation? 
Traditionally, the literature on the political economy of industrialised democracies, rooted in a class-
analytical understanding, perceived trade unions, together with social-democratic parties, as the nat-
ural interest representation of the entire working class – challenging the predominance of business in 
capitalist societies. Empirically, this analysis largely builds on the Scandinavian experience, and on the 
Swedish case in particular. There, trade unions have historically enjoyed exceptionally high member-
ship rates coupled with horizontal institutional structures that paved way to the pursuit of solidaristic 
and inclusive policies, as the entire working class was effectively represented by the labour move-
ment.10 Yet, representing the entire working class has become an increasingly difficult task for unions 
with the intensification of distributional struggles since the 1970s. These are typically associated with 
globalisation and de-industrialisation – the former putting pressure on labour costs in increasingly 
price-sensitive global markets, and the latter transforming labour market structures, especially 
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through the rise of service sector employment and its association with fixed-term employment and 
shorter job tenure. The insider/outsider literature points out that the preferences for social and em-
ployment protection of someone in a traditional employment relation could be rather different to the 
interests of someone in irregular employment at the margins of the labour market. For insiders, it is 
argued that employment protection is an absolute priority, whereas unemployment protection is 
viewed critically because it tends to benefit labour market outsiders with their much greater exposure 
to the risk of unemployment.11  
Far-reaching dualisation in Continental and Southern Europe as well as East Asia, especially in 
the aftermath of labour market deregulation, can be thought as having intensified earlier distribu-
tional struggles, posing a fundamental challenge to organised labour that has built its industrial and 
political strategies around an assumption of standard (full) employment as both reality and normative 
goal. In this context, the literature increasingly questions the earlier class-analytical approach and ra-
ther depicts trade unions as “insider-focussed” organisations contributing to labour market dualisa-
tion. Empirically, the focus shifted from the Scandinavian experience to the dualising countries of Con-
tinental and Southern Europe. In the “Western” literature, a “new” political-economy consensus 
emerged suggesting that unions prioritise the interests of their core members in permanent employ-
ment, but similar arguments can be observed in the East Asian political economy literature as well.12 
Whilst insider-focused strategies might still involve considerable conflict between organised labour 
and employers with unions continuing to press for better wage and benefit packages for their mem-
bers in collective bargaining, they also allow for the establishment of (cross-class) producer coalitions 
between unions and employers. In exchange for their privileged position, insiders and their unions 
agree to the use of “cheaper” irregular workers in order to maintain their companies’ competitiveness. 
In this insider-oriented strategy at the explicit expense of outsiders, unions can indeed be considered 
“complicit” in dualisation and rising social inequality. Initially, this theorisation of unions’ preferences 
and agency was primarily inferred from the German experience, where scholars noted in particular a 
trend towards decentralisation of industrial relations that unions did not significantly challenge and 
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that led to labour pursuing increasingly particularistic interests in the workplace at the expense of 
broader social or class solidarity objectives.13 Unsurprisingly, labour market outsiders paid the price 
for particularistic union strategies, as they saw their position rapidly worsening in the realm of both 
the labour market (in the form of low-wage employment) and social protection. In a slight modifica-
tion of the insider/outsider model, it is acknowledged that unions might not have a genuine prefer-
ence for exposing outsiders to greater insecurity, but still they agree to labour market deregulation at 
the margins in order to maintain their position in labour market policy-making. Critically, whilst unions 
are here prepared to sacrifice outsiders, they are not assumed to give in on labour market protection 
for their core membership.14  Thus, effectively though reluctantly, unions pursue insider/outsider 
strategies nonetheless. Models portraying unions as largely pursuing exclusive and particularistic 
strategies have gained much prominence in recent years and might be best described as the new po-
litical economy “mainstream”. Crucially, whilst most of this literature refers empirically to develop-
ments taking place in the 1990s and early 2000s, recent contributions extended insider/outsider mod-
els and producer coalition arguments to the analysis of policy and institutional change during the re-
cent financial and economic crisis.15 
Yet, the view of insider-focussed trade unions pursuing exclusive strategies is far from being 
unchallenged – on both theoretical and empirical grounds. The socio-economic transformations of 
globalisation and dualisation have hollowed out core workforces in manufacturing industries in par-
ticular, the traditional main pool for the recruitment of union members; and in the growing service 
sector we find labour struggling to mobilise new members (though with some notable exceptions, 
such as the Scandinavian countries). These transformations translated, across the OECD world, into a 
secular decline in trade union membership and provide the functional underpinnings for an alternative 
strategic orientation of trade unions, as the above described strategy of exclusivity cannot be expected 
to rejuvenate the movement. Rather, it might in fact undermine unions’ capacity to remain a mean-
ingful social force. The crucial point to note here is that insider-focussed strategies might be feasible 
in a context of equilibrium between the “core and periphery”, where the former represents a stable 
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and extremely sizeable share of the labour market. However, we have seen a successive erosion of 
the core of the labour market and a related rise in social inequality,16 which can be thought as politi-
cally undermining the equilibrium that is commonly associated with dualisation.17 In other words, ra-
ther than considering dualisation a stable, self-reinforcing mechanism, it needs to be viewed as a po-
tentially powerful mechanism altering the (perceived) benefits of institutional settings. This makes it 
theoretically plausible that unions, instead of prioritising insiders, pursue the opposite strategy, 
namely broadening their constituency and agency as a counter-movement to the secular trend of la-
bour market liberalisation and segmentation of social protection occurring across advanced capitalist 
countries.18 In this context, increasing appeal to outsiders can be perceived as an alternative impera-
tive, and the revitalisation literature suggests a strategy of greater inclusion that ascribes to unions 
“meaningful proactive choices beyond adaptation and subordination”.19 Critically, this literature re-
fers to Hyman’s distinction between business, class and social unionism,20 and it argues that trade 
unions’ perception of what a problem is and corresponding responses are shaped by their historical 
identities and associated institutional structures.  
The importance of trade union identities and structures is empirically confirmed in recent 
work calling into question insider/outsider and producer coalition approaches.21 These contributions 
challenge the role of trade unions as drivers of dualisation and highlight cross-national variation in 
union responses to dualisation, teasing out the key role of unions’ historical identities and institutional 
structures in explaining such variation. More specifically, recent accounts of union agency distinguish 
between business unionism leading, by and large, to insider-focussed particularistic strategies, 
whereas class unionism and especially social unionism present greater openness towards representing 
and bargaining on behalf of a broader constituency, including labour market outsiders. Again, the 
Scandinavian countries are prime examples of inclusive unionism, owing to their persistently high 
membership rates, institutionalised involvement in the management of unemployment benefits 
through Ghent systems and an organisational structure that facilitates solidaristic linkages between 
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segments of the workforce, which also extends to precarious workers and the unemployed.22 Not-
withstanding profound structural transformations and associated socio-economic challenges, trade 
unions in these countries have found creative solutions to uphold highly solidaristic policies.23 Recent 
research has also found a “Southern European path” towards inclusive unionism, where strong class 
identity is identified as key factor behind unions’ choice to extend workplace solidarity to labour mar-
ket outsiders, while also highlighting, however, limited inclusion in the realm of social protection.24 In 
business unionism, limited outsider representation is possible only when the interests of insiders and 
outsiders overlap. Yet, recent research suggests a fairly exclusive stance of rather market-oriented 
unions, which are by and large to be found in Continental Europe and, in a much more pronounced 
fashion, in East Asia.25  
Despite providing important insights, these contributions, often based on the analysis of un-
ions at a single point in time, do not fully capture the transformation of trade union agency. Treating 
union identity as a “fixed” independent variable, the union-identity literature cannot account for the 
emergence of more inclusive social unionism in the two-most different cases considered here, namely 
Korean business unionism and Italian class unionism, both displaying significant barriers to the pursuit 
of broad solidaristic agendas. In particular, the Korean case challenges perceived wisdom, both in the 
mainstream literature and in more recent critical contributions; and it shows how, starting from busi-
ness unionism, unions can open up to a broader solidaristic orientation. The Italian case, on the other 
hand, shows that class-based unionism can pursue solidaristic strategies not only in the industrial re-
lations arena but also in the realm of social protection. Thus, while union-identity approaches restrict 
their analysis to the industrial relations dimension, we broaden the empirical scope to the public and 
social policy preferences of trade unions, and we show how both Korean and Italian unions success-
fully moved from fully exclusive or partially inclusive strategies towards greater inclusiveness and sol-
idarity in both the industrial relations and social protection domains. This raises the critical question 
of under what socio-economic and socio-political conditions should we expect unions’ identity to shift 
from an exclusive business model or a partially-inclusive class model towards a more widely inclusive 
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model of “solidarity for all”. In the following, we first analyse how Italians trade unions developed 
greater inclusiveness in the workplace and social protection, before turning to Korean organised la-
bour.  
 
Italian Trade Union Strategies: From Workplace Solidarity to Social Solidarity 
The historical policy preferences of Italian unions along the industrial relations and public policy di-
mensions closely align with insider/outsider theory. Whilst, in principle, thriving for the representation 
of the working class in its entirety and opposing differential treatments between segments of the 
workforce, Italian unions strongly and exclusively focussed until the 1980s on defending their mem-
bers’ interests by pushing for policies that would boost economic growth and permanent, well-remu-
nerated employment. To the extent that full employment was their prime interest, expanding social 
protection to the “unproductive” share of the population was actively opposed, denoting a strong 
workfarist orientation of union agency. This strategy achieved high levels of security for union mem-
bers but scant social protection for those at the margins of the labour market (notably, the unem-
ployed and non-standard workers).26  
However, the 1990s brought about sharp changes. As economic and political pressures from 
globalisation and European integration grew stronger, successive (centre-left and centre-right) gov-
ernments implemented a series of reforms deregulating the labour market. In particular, despite un-
ions’ scepticism towards supply-side reform of the labour market, 27  the centre-left government 
passed a reform in 1997 that introduced a considerable degree of flexibility at the margins of the 
labour market (most notably, allowing temporary agency work, which was previously banned in It-
aly).28 As the 1997 reform has been considered as marking a departure from traditional labour market 
policy in Italy,29 examining union agency in the context of this reform is instructive to understand or-
ganised labour’s preferences and strategies in the face of labour market dualisation. Indeed, following 
the reform, non-standard work quickly ceased to be a residual phenomenon responding to specific 
needs (such as seasonal work) but rather became a defining feature of the labour market.30 But where 
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did unions stand in these processes? Instead of passively accepting labour market dualisation, union 
strategy was characterised by efforts to contain labour market dualisation and collectivise new social 
risks.31 Union documents from the mid-1990s show that the main challenge perceived by unions was 
the sharply rising share of employment that no longer corresponded with the “traditional” workers 
that unions had been representing historically.32 Accordingly, it was identified as key responsibility of 
a confederal union “to recompose lacerations and juxtapositions among different subjects in the la-
bour market and in the workplace”,33 with senior confederal leaders taking a particularly active role 
in setting an inclusive course as a response to labour market deregulation and the rise of workers in 
atypical forms of employment34. Indeed, the role of the confederations was highlighted by interview-
ees from across the union movement spectrum. A senior representative from the General Confeder-
ation of Labour (CGIL), the traditionally left-leaning union, argued that: “We are a general confedera-
tion of labour, and we therefore think that labour as such must be represented, in its various forms, 
and that the interests of labour should always be unified and brought to unity.”35 The same reasoning 
was illustrated by a representative of the Italian Confederation of Workers’ Unions (CISL), the centrist-
catholic confederation: “In our culture of representation […], the union should equally represent in-
dependent work, dependent work and […] atypical work, because it is part of our cultural approach 
which we have traditionally had.”36 Critically, this approach travelled “down” from the confederations 
to industrial unions that also shared this view, as explained by a senior representative of the metal 
workers’ union: “The fact that the union is confederal favours the inclusion of all types of workers.”37 
In correspondence with the perceived challenge and responsibility, union agency took place 
at three different levels: (i) lobbying at the level of national policy-making;38 (ii) collective bargaining 
on behalf of non-standard workers; and (iii) setting up “bilateral funds” jointly managed with employ-
ers.39 Participation in national level policy-making took place in the macro-corporatist arena that char-
acterised the Italian political economy in the 1990s.40 In this context, a collaborative relationship be-
tween the centre-left government and unions allowed them to exert significant influence on the out-
come of the reform. Though unions could not prevent greater labour market flexibility, neither could 
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the government deregulate the labour market as much as it initially planned.41 Critically, in the 1997 
reform, unions were successful in achieving parity of salary between agency and permanent workers 
to disincentivise firms to replace regular workers with non-standard ones.42  
As far as collective bargaining is concerned, a landmark development was achieved in 1998 
when all the confederal unions set up organisations specifically to represent non-standard workers 
and to sign collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the association of temporary work agencies. 
The organisations representing non-standard workers operate in close cooperation with the industry-
level federations in a complementary relationship: the non-standard worker unions provide horizontal 
representation focussing on issues that have to do with the nature of non-standard employment (for 
instance, setting ceilings on the use of non-standard contracts), while industry-level federations in-
clude non-standard workers to ensure that their needs are understood and catered for in the work-
place.43 Motivated by a commitment towards workplace solidarity between non-standard and perma-
nent workers, CBAs offered a set of policy solutions to meet the challenges that the unions identified 
in an increasingly deregulated labour market: not only do CBAs reiterate parity of salary between 
agency workers and their colleagues on regular contracts, but also specify equality between regular 
and agency workers for a variety of non-wage issues and benefits, such as working hours, over-
time/night-time work and annual leave.44 Furthermore, CBAs put a ceiling on the share of agency work 
that firms are allowed to employ as a proportion of the total workforce and an upper-limit of 42 
months to employment as agency worker before mandatory conversion into regular employment.45 
Importantly, industry-level CBAs often go beyond CBAs for agency workers by making certain condi-
tions more favourable, such as shorter timeframes for the conversion of agency workers into regular 
employees,46 because, as explained by a CGIL official, “we keep thinking that atypical work cannot be 
seen as a stable condition for individuals, but it should rather be a temporary condition”.47 Thus, while 
the establishment of union organisations to represent non-standard workers might be interpreted as 
largely symbolic, the numerous CBAs that these organisations signed shortly after their establishment 
provide significant evidence that rhetoric and action were strongly tied together.  
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This development can be viewed as a path-dependent response stemming from the class ori-
entation of Italian confederal unionism, which is characterised by the objective of representing all 
workers and bargaining on their behalf, regardless of their employment status.48 As further evidence 
of inclusive workplace strategies for all workers, it has been reported that not only atypical workers 
but also migrant workers in Italy enjoy highly inclusive strategies in the workplace, owing to unions’ 
historical class-oriented identity49. Yet, this line of reasoning could be challenged from an insider/out-
sider perspective insofar as the provisions bargained through the collective agreements are of equal 
benefit to insiders by insulating them from competition from outsiders, and therefore could be re-
garded as part of an insider-focussed strategy. However, such an interpretation does not hold when 
we turn to the third strand of union agency, namely that of “bilateralism”. Through the establishment 
of a bilateral fund, jointly managed with employers and financed through mandatory contributions by 
temporary work agencies, unions created a remarkable framework of training for agency workers, 
which had been identified in insider/outsider theory as a crucial demand of outsiders, yet one that 
unions are expected to oppose rather than to push for.50 Notably, despite Italy being a laggard by 
European standards in the provision of active labour market policy, Italian agency workers enjoy ex-
tensive access to training compared to their European counterparts, with over 35% of agency workers 
having received training in 2008 (of the countries for which comparative data is available, the Nether-
lands has the second highest share of coverage at 19%).51 This shows that the three confederal unions, 
through organisations specifically set-up to represent atypical workers, achieved remarkable results 
in this policy area, and the framework of training for agency workers speaks strongly in favour of an 
interpretation of union agency as one centred on the collectivisation of the risks stemming from labour 
market outsiderness rather than narrowly furthering insider interests. Indeed, extensive training op-
portunities for outsiders cannot be interpreted as (directly or indirectly) favouring insiders; rather, by 
improving outsiders’ employability they could be seen, if anything, as a threat to insiders.52  
The same strategic action described with respect to the introduction of temporary agency 
work in 1997 can also be found when a centre-right government passed a labour market reform in 
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2003 that significantly expanded the types of non-standard work that employers could resort to (such 
as project-based work).53 In this context, unions still retained a role in the policy-making process, albeit 
best characterised as conflictual rather than cooperative. Their ability to contain labour market dual-
isation was severely reduced, as the centre-right government did not show the same commitment to 
negotiating with unions displayed by the centre-left government,54 starting a process of political mar-
ginalisation that would become even more pronounced in the following years. Yet, even in a colder 
political climate and in a context of proliferation of additional forms of irregular work, unions used 
collective bargaining at national, sectoral and firm level to represent non-standard workers,55 display-
ing therefore a high degree of workplace solidarity.  
 Inclusive strategies along the industrial relations dimension in terms of both wage and non-
wage issues and in the domain of training, however, were not matched as far as social protection was 
concerned. Indeed, assessing the priorities of trade unions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it has 
been noted how unions, driven by the pursuit of workplace solidarity and full employment, have been 
reluctant to support non-contributory income protection, focussing instead their efforts on “(mostly  
resistance  against)  pension reforms,  labour  market  competitiveness,  wage  negotiation  and  in-
surance based  contributory unemployment compensation”.56 Paradigmatic in this respect was the 
establishment of a separate bilateral fund for the provision of income protection for agency workers 
that was characterised by strict adherence to social insurance principles and high contributory require-
ments. As such, the fund is effectively hardly accessible for agency workers, whose employment rec-
ord is characterised by short and discontinuous social security contributions. In stark contrast with 
training opportunities, where Italian agency workers enjoyed a favourable outlook by comparative 
standards, universal income protection that moved away from strict contributory principles did not 
feature on unions’ agenda in the 1990s and the early 2000s.57  
This set of selectively inclusive preferences needs to be understood against the background of 
the time. Unions operated, politically, in a context in which they were (particularly in the 1990s) still a 
relevant player58 and, economically, in an expanding labour market.59 These two conditions were seen 
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by unions as allowing them to include outsiders without deviating from their traditional agency rooted 
in class identity;60 and, accordingly, they devised a strategy that prioritised employment over social 
protection also for outsiders. In social concertation and collective bargaining, it became a union prior-
ity, in the face of employers’ preference for an outright deregulation of temporary employment, to 
establish a framework facilitating the transition from non-standard work to permanent employment, 
which trade unions considered a feasible strategy in an expanding labour market.61   
Socio-economic and socio-political conditions, however, changed dramatically over the course 
of the following decade, and the viability of unions’ workfarist strategies was effectively undermined 
by the 2007 global economic crisis and by unions’ increasing political marginalisation. In other words, 
the challenges that labour faced changed profoundly as the expansion of atypical employment be-
came only one among several challenges that unions were faced with. In particular, rising poverty 
rates and social exclusion as a consequence of the economic crisis became a defining socio-economic 
feature, together with an increasingly hostile attitude of governments towards the unions. As a con-
sequence of this “double crisis”, we find Italian unions moving towards social unionism, ascribing more 
importance than ever in the past to universal forms of social protection, and embracing a broader 
notion of social solidarity stretching beyond the industrial relations arena. The loss of one million jobs 
between 2008 and 201362 is a striking indicator of the changed socio-economic context. In a shrinking 
labour market, an exclusive focus on fostering transitions from non-standard to regular employment 
proved untenable, and the economic crisis provided the motivations for a strategic re-orientation of 
union agency whereby the issue of income protection gained salience.  
This shift can be clearly detected through the changing policy position of the CGIL , which 
represents a critical case within the Italian labour movement, not only because it is the largest of the 
three confederal unions but also because it was most strongly oriented towards the workfarist ap-
proach in social policy. In 2010, the CGIL presented a two-pronged proposal for a more inclusive social 
protection system: firstly, contributory requirements should be lowered and made more homogene-
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ous across sectors and firms; and secondly, a non-contributory element should be introduced to en-
sure coverage for those who cannot access the social insurance system. The proposal was motivated 
precisely on the grounds of the changed material conditions. The document outlining the reform pro-
posal begins by arguing that “the crisis […] has heightened the urgency and need to reform the social 
protection system”63 and that a reformed system should lead to “the inclusion through a public and 
universal system with no difference for workers based on economic sector, firm size, geographical 
location or type of employment”.64 The first part of the proposal was short-lived, as it was shelved by 
the technocratic government in office between 2011 and 2013 on the basis that it was fiscally too 
expensive.65 Nevertheless, several unions continued to campaign for more inclusive income protec-
tion. An important agenda-setting role can be ascribed in particular to the CGIL affiliated union of 
workers in education and research, where staff is often employed on short-term contracts (e.g. corre-
sponding with the school year), which prevent them from making sufficient social security contribu-
tions to qualify for income support between contracts (e.g. during school closure in the summer holi-
days). The corresponding campaign, named “Employment is discontinuous, life isn’t”, has been 
launched in 2013 to keep the public spotlight on the issue of income protection for non-standard 
workers.66 Admittedly, active campaigning to universalise income protection was most prominent 
among those unions whose members are relatively more exposed to the risk of unemployment.67 
Conversely, such campaigns do not present a priority for unions representing workers in core indus-
trial sectors, where discontinuous employment and corresponding gaps in income do not pose a major 
threat to their members. However, it should be made explicit that lack of active engagement did not 
translate into active opposition from these unions or parallel insider-oriented campaigns. Critically, 
the confederations – which are labour’s voice in public- and social-policy making at the national level 
– developed their position in close correspondence with the preferences of the sectoral unions repre-
senting those workers highly exposed to discontinuous employment, confirming the commitment of 
confederal unions to represent all workers, including those in weaker segments of the labour market.68 
Indeed, in the most recent reform of unemployment protection in 2015, unions’ criticism was precisely 
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directed at the lack of true universalism as the reform “failed to adequately cover quasi-subordinate 
[i.e. non-standard] workers and seasonal workers”.69  
The second strand of labour’s campaign for more inclusive social protection – namely the in-
troduction of a non-contributory element of income support – saw a more favourable political out-
come, as it developed through the “Alliance against Poverty” – a network of civil society organisations 
that the three confederal unions joined as founding partners. The Alliance against Poverty has been 
lobbying since 2013 for the introduction of a means-tested, non-contributory “Social Inclusion Income” 
in order to fill the considerable gaps in Italian social protection. Through the engagement with civil 
society organisations in the Alliance, the broader labour movement developed greater sensitivity to 
the need to improve income protection for the rising number of individuals – both unemployed and 
employed in low-wage jobs – facing the risk of poverty and social exclusion. In recent reforms, the role 
of the Alliance against Poverty has been significant. In particular, it has directly inspired a package of 
anti-poverty measures, featuring an inclusion income (detached from contributory requirements) as 
one of its central policies, which was approved by parliament in 2017.70 As such the proposal of the 
Alliance laid the grounds for the introduction of a national-level, non-contributory income support 
scheme, which was never established before in Italy – the only European country, together with 
Greece, where such instrument was not part of the social policy mix.71 The Minister of Labour and 
Welfare publicly acknowledged at the beginning of the legislative process the crucial role played by 
the Alliance in placing poverty and social exclusion at the centre of the political debate and in defining 
the reform proposals that were being examined by the Parliament.72 Here, it is worth noting that or-
ganised labour, as the only actor within the Alliance with an established profile and history of cooper-
ation with policy-makers, played a critical role in making the Alliance’s proposal gain political trac-
tion.73 As in the case of extending collective bargaining to outsiders, it was the confederal structure of 
the union that prompted participation of the confederations in this policy initiative, as explained by a 
senior CGIL official: “There has been the role of a group of senior unionists that dealt with this issue 
[the Alliance and more broadly welfare universalization] at UIL, CISL an CGIL [the three confederal 
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organisations]…and at one point…as the officials responsible for welfare, we took the responsibility.”74 
The three confederal unions, by joining the Alliance, embraced a notion of social solidarity including 
all non-standard workers as well as the unemployed, in discontinuity with their strict workfarist tradi-
tion inherited from their class identity. The economic crisis certainly stands out as motivating factor 
for the evolution of unions’ preferences, with all three confederations arguing that growing social 
exclusion after the crisis was a key challenge that they had to face and, therefore, was the key reason 
for joining the Alliance against Poverty,75 as articulated by a CGIL representative: “With the economic 
crisis, the phenomenon [of poverty] has increased and changed. Think for instance of families with 
young children, think for instance of working poverty. […] At that point, it has been a choice of the 
welfare department of the CGIL, as we realised two things: Firstly, that Italy did not have a system of 
guaranteed minimum income. […] Secondly, there were no specific policies against poverty other than 
very fragmented instruments that are nonetheless often referred to specific categories of workers. […] 
We were lacking an instrument and at that point and faced by those numbers [of growing poverty and 
social exclusion] we thought that an instrument was necessary.”76 Indeed, the crisis not only height-
ened the need to establish a universal instrument of income support, but also triggered a consensual 
approach across the three confederations allowing them to overcome some disagreements, for in-
stance on whom the main beneficiaries of the policy ought to be: “Between CGIL, CISL and UIL, there 
are differences. […] The fact that we stand together doesn’t mean we agree on everything. […] But I 
am happy with the work we’ve done within the Alliance, exactly because we all shared an objective; 
and we all took a step back from our initial positions, because we found a way to work together. […] 
Yet, there were differences, and there still are.”77 
Yet, political considerations were also a crucial factor, as organised labour was challenged by 
increasing political marginalisation since the mid-2000s.78 As an example of the changed socio-political 
context, Prime Minister Mario Monti (leading a technocratic government from 2011 to 2013) argued 
that the systematic involvement of social partners in policy-making has generated negative side-ef-
fects that future generations will have to pay for.79 Along the same lines, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi 
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(leading a centre-left government from 2014 to 2016) argued rather outspokenly that “it is important 
[…] to give a message that, if unions are against these proposals [of reform of the labour market], 
please let us continue and go ahead. We are not stopped by the fate of the unions. […] I believe that 
people are on our side [i.e. the government], not on the side of the unions”.80 Importantly, Prime 
Minister Renzi made these declarations at the peak of his political popularity, signalling the govern-
ment‘s intention to pursue reforms without seeking union consent. Thus, the unions not only saw 
their ability to influence policy-making significantly diminish, but they also faced the problem of their 
broader public recognition being actively undermined by governments of all stripes. Correspondingly, 
public opinion data show an increasing dissatisfaction of the general public with trade unions.81 In this 
respect, a policy document analysing the timing of the emergence of the Alliance against Poverty ar-
gues that unions’ unprecedented firm support for the universalisation of social protection should be 
partly ascribed to strategic political reasoning. In particular, promoting inclusive social policies allowed 
the unions to engage with parts of society that do not belong to their traditional constituencies, which 
can be seen as an attempt to reverse the trend of decreasing popularity with the public.82 Consistent 
with this assessment, a representative of one of the confederal unions, CISL, explicitly linked joining 
the Alliance to an effort of unions to “gain new social legitimisation” in recognition that unions “cannot 
limit themselves to the protection and promotion of permanent workers and pensioners”,83 denoting 
how the different socio-political context provided an incentive structure for unions’ to devise strate-
gies beyond their traditional constituencies and their traditional domain of the workplace. A similar 
strategic reasoning was developed by a senior CGIL official responsible for social policies: “On the 
terrain of universalism and welfare, the traditional union battle is not enough, because if you take the 
traditional union stance not only you will lean more towards the protection of dependent work but 
also because you would often end up with insurance-based solutions. […] On universalism, I believe 
there should be different proposals next to a different thinking.”84 
To conclude, as governments first deregulated the labour market in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, workplace solidarity was quickly extended to non-standard workers but the universalisation of 
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income protection was not being pursued as convincingly. Unions, in other words, tried to include a 
new segment of the workforce by making use of, by and large, their traditional strategies (that is pri-
oritising employment conditions over welfare also for non-standard workers). Yet, their strict adher-
ence to a workfarist class identity was challenged by the economic crisis and by their increasing polit-
ical marginalisation. The shrinking of the core workforce coupled with rising social exclusion chal-
lenged the effectiveness of strategies based primarily on workplace solidarity. In this context, extend-
ing the coverage of income protection became an important element of unions’ strategy, which led 
them not only to respond to profound socio-economic transformations but also to engage in new 
forms of socio-political agency. The more comprehensive solidaristic re-orientation of union agency 
signals an increasing concern towards the unemployed and an increasing openness towards non-con-
tributory forms of income support, which is not replacing the traditional focus on workplace solidarity 
but it rather presents an extension of union agency to relatively new (social and public) policy domains. 
 
Korean Trade Unions Strategies: From Business Unionism to Social Solidarity 
Prior to Korea’ democratisation in 1987, the country’s social policies can be described as being most 
modest with only small parts of the population receiving minimal social protection (e.g. civil servants 
and core industrial workers). Instead of providing social welfare, the authoritarian state “protected” 
jobs with strict employment regulations and in particular with enforcing a no-lay-off policy in large 
workplaces. Also, rapid industrialisation in the 1970s and 1980s created plenty of job opportunities 
and allowed for relatively little social inequality despite residual social protection. Here, the govern-
ment’s wage guidelines were critical, as they prevented any significant wage differences between 
large companies and SMEs.85 Whilst acknowledging the interests of workers, the authoritarian state 
did not allow any meaningful interest representation, as this was feared to facilitate progressive ide-
ology and class identity that could have destabilised the undemocratic regime. Yet, some limited work-
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ers’ organisation in the workplace was permitted to keep the labour movement fragmented by pro-
moting business unionism and forcing unions to be affiliated with the government-sanctioned Feder-
ation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU).86 
 Democratisation in the late 1980s, however, provided organised labour with unprecedented 
power resources – and, with great militancy, unions (in large workplaces in particular) used their new 
strength to achieve considerable improvements in wages and enterprise welfare, opening up an in-
creasing gap between large companies and SMEs. At the same time, employers, confronted with con-
siderable increases in labour costs which put mounting pressure on the price competitiveness of ex-
port-oriented industries, started pressing for labour market deregulation, and a right-wing govern-
ment (1993-98) responded to calls for neo-liberal reform. In awareness of the strength and militancy 
of organised labour, though, the government proposed the introduction of unemployment protection 
(albeit modest and restricted to labour market insiders) in order to achieve consensual labour market 
reform. But unions did not show any interest in unemployment protection. Not only was employment 
protection considered an absolute priority by unions, but also it was believed that action in the indus-
trial arena (namely, achieving better wages and enterprise welfare) was the best strategy for improv-
ing the material conditions of workers, effectively making public social protection an afterthought at 
best. After failed negotiations, the government enacted labour market deregulation unilaterally, but 
a general strike that brought the country to a stand-still for one month prevented the implementation 
of labour market reform.87 Apparently, corresponding with insider/outsider theory, organised labour 
after democratisation continued to be preoccupied with particularistic interests in the workplace (es-
pecially, large ones), whilst showing little, if not no concerns for those at the margins of the labour 
market and especially the unemployed. The weakest groups in society, who would have benefited 
immensely from greater public welfare and particularly unemployment protection, because of their 
weak labour market position, were not represented by organised labour. In Korean business unionism, 
solidarity remained restricted to fellow union members in their workplace. 
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 The scene changed dramatically with the East Asian financial crisis of 1997. Unemployment 
rose from 2 to 8.5 percent; and the country saw major bankruptcies across the economy, including 
chaebols (family-controlled business conglomerates), which were previously considered to be “safe 
havens” for employment. In this severe economic crisis and faced with large-scale foreign capital flight, 
the newly-elected centre-left government (1998-2003), despite previously rejecting deregulation, saw 
no alternative to greater labour market flexibility for both insiders and outsiders in order to facilitate 
the restructuring of failing companies. Having learnt the lesson from its predecessor, the new admin-
istration proactively sought consensual labour market reform, and it put much emphasis on negotia-
tions in the Tripartite Commission, through which both organised business and labour were formally 
involved in labour market policy-making.88 Importantly, besides FKTU, a formerly outlawed and com-
peting trade union confederation with strong links to the democratisation movement was invited as 
well. Rejecting FKTU’s business unionisms, the leaders of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU) strived for broader economic and social reform, and we thus find KCTU as a peak organisation 
best characterised as social (movement) unionism – and this social unionism identity drove its funda-
mental motivation to embrace labour market outsiders. Having said this, at the workplace level, KCTU 
member unions (particularly chaebol enterprise unions, which enjoyed great autonomy) pursued, with 
great militancy, insider interests for their constituencies.89 
 In the Tripartite Commission, both labour confederations pursued a radical policy U-turn by 
accepting labour market deregulation of both regular and irregular employment, in exchange of im-
proved unemployment protection (especially, for outsiders) and improved labour rights (for instance, 
the recognition of teachers’ unions). Here, it is important to underline that organised labour prioritised 
improving unemployment protection for outsiders, when other insider-focussed policies (such as im-
proving Bismarckian old-age security) could have been demanded – indicating unions’ genuine com-
mitment to improving the conditions for irregular workers. For consenting to deregulation, the expe-
rience of large-scale bankruptcies was critical, as union leaders acknowledged the “new reality” of 
limits to the established practice of life-time employment, and more generally they arrived at the 
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conclusion that the traditional welfare-through-work model had become ever less feasible considering 
Korea’s extremely export-oriented growth model in evermore competitive global markets (that is, the 
recognition of severe limits to future wage increases and enterprise welfare). With (militant) industrial 
action increasingly struggling to achieve better living conditions for workers, “in the wake of the crisis, 
KCTU tried to shift their emphasis from wage increases at firm level to public welfare policies”90, as 
explained by a senior policy officer at FKTU; and we observe both KCTU and FKTU pushing for these 
policies beyond the readiness of the new centre-left government.91 In addition to this change in the 
material conditions, Korean unions also faced mounting criticism in the public that they were largely 
self-serving, prioritising insider interests and effectively ignoring those at the margins of the labour 
market. Although the public showed a great support to the labour movement during the period im-
mediately after the democratic transition, due to unions’ active involvement in the democratic strug-
gle, the immense public criticism and pressure to overcome the narrow interest representation was 
perceived as a potentially existential crisis of the Korean labour movement, which also experienced a 
significant drop in membership. In this context, union leaders, especially those of labour federations, 
effectively fearing de-legitimisation in society, felt the imperative to “reinvent” and “revitalise” the 
movement in order to re-main a meaningful social force – “to address the public criticism of self-
serving behaviour, the representation of labour market outsiders was considered critical”92, a senior 
policy officer with KCTU underlines. In other words, they considered reinventing the labour movement 
as an inclusive one, by championing the right of labour market outsiders, key to the re-legitimisation 
and revitalisation of the movement.93  
Thus, the East Asian crisis fundamentally changed the socio-economic and socio-political un-
derpinnings for unions, challenging established behaviours and strategies, and the Tripartite Commis-
sion provided labour confederations a new forum for exercising influence in social policy-making. The 
KCTU leadership in particular, corresponding with its social movement identity and its ideological de-
sire for broader economic and social reform, seized this opportunity by promoting broader social sol-
idarity in the form of better social protection for those at the periphery of the labour market. FKTU, 
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though in the past explicitly rejecting the inclusion of outsiders in social insurances,94 adopted in prin-
ciple the same positions despite the lack of any social movement legacy. “Increased competition [for 
members] between the two confederations”95, as highlighted by a senior policy officer at FKTU, and a 
political climate in which the conditions of irregular workers became a major political issue that could 
not be ignored pushed FKTU towards the left, whilst in practice still maintaining a more conciliatory 
approach and greater readiness to compromise in correspondence with the union’s legacy of prag-
matic business unionism.96 
 The policy U-turn of union confederations, however, created a serious cleavage between the 
centre and enterprise unions (especially, chaebol unions), which continued to prioritise insider inter-
ests and fiercely opposed the deregulation of regular employment. The KCTU leadership was particu-
larly challenged and eventually replaced, although the change in leadership had no direct policy im-
plications. Nonetheless, it revealed deep divisions that existed within labour. Many enterprise unions, 
lacking a sense of solidarity beyond their narrow membership, not only prevented irregular workers 
from joining them, but insiders actually looked quite favourably at the use of non-standard workers, 
as these were seen, acknowledged by representatives from both KCTU and FKTU, as “buffers”97 that 
contributed to their employment security in economic crisis.98 In other words, progressive union lead-
ers, recognising the risks and dangers of irregular employment, faced enterprise unions that were 
prepared to enter producer coalition with employers in order to secure their employment at the ex-
pense of outsiders.  
However, the massive increase in irregular employment in the aftermath of the East Asian 
financial crisis and labour market deregulation made many enterprise unions more receptive towards 
the concerns of non-standard workers. Across different parts of the union movement, labour market 
dualisation was increasingly seen as raising “the question of organisational strength and survival of 
unions as a meaningful social force”99, as put by a KCTU senior policy officer – with dualisation eroding 
internal labour markets from which the great majority of members were recruited. In other words, 
irregular employment was not only considered a social problem but also as a “serious crisis for the 
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labour movement” 100, as argued by a representative of the KCTU affiliated Seoul General Union. Un-
surprisingly, industries that were particularly hit by economic crisis (for instance, the finance sector) 
opened up to irregular workers more quickly, whereas the metalworking industry, for example, was 
somewhat slow to change. In fact, Hyundai Heavy Industry company union was expelled from the 
Korean Metal Workers’ Union (a KCTU member union) for their discriminatory stance towards non-
standard workers. However, when the shipbuilding industry faced severe corporate restructuring in 
the face of increasing competition from China, enterprise unions in shipbuilding and other metal-
working industries started to represent the interests of outsiders as well (for instance, negotiating 
wages on their behalf for greater workplace solidarity), in recognition that “cheap” irregular employ-
ment and the widening gap between insiders and outsiders ultimately presents “a barrier to achieving 
standard workers’ demands for better wages and working conditions”, as summarised by a repre-
sentative from the KCTU affiliated metal workers’ union.101 Having said this, despite greater inclusive-
ness, enterprise unions did not give up their prioritisation of insiders, but they started to perceive an 
overlap of insider and outsider interests.102  
In addition to the observed change in the material conditions, it is important to highlight that 
pressure from labour confederations on company unions to become more inclusive “has started to 
make a difference”.103 The genuine commitment of peak organisations to greater inclusiveness to-
wards labour market outsiders was translated into important action – including the above mentioned 
expulsion of Hyundai Heavy Industry company union, but also KCTU’s “solidarity wage” initiative, 
which a union officer explicitly described as a strategy “to close the wage gap between standard and 
non-standard workers”104 by promoting lump-sum pay increases rather than percentage point in-
creases to the benefit of better remunerated regular workers.105 Furthermore, recognising the insti-
tutional deficiencies of Korea’s fragmented industrial relations system, the union leadership intensi-
fied the reorganisation along industrial union structures, with support from many enterprise unions 
acknowledging that one, in the words of a policy officer of the FKTU affiliated financial industry union, 
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“cannot fight capital as company unions”.106 Although these initiatives might have been of limited suc-
cess because of great hostility from business (and in fact some powerful chaebol unions),107 these 
observations question the assumption of exclusive unions in insider/outsider and producer coalition 
theories. 
In the domain of public policy, we also find unions, in close cooperation with civil society or-
ganisations, pushing for legislation on irregular employment starting in 2000. The massive increase in 
non-standard employment and the growing gap between insiders and outsiders made dualisation and 
associated social inequality and exclusion important political issues that could not be ignored by any 
progressive force.108 Joining forces in the “Alliance for Non-Standard Workers” for greater political 
impact, trade unions and civil society organisations set the agenda for limiting irregular employment 
and stipulating the principle of non-discrimination, whereas the second centre-left but business-
friendly government (2003-2008) was only prepared to commit to much laxer regulation (for instance, 
the proposal of a three-year limit and allowing reasonable discrimination of irregular workers). How-
ever, pressure from unions in the Tripartite Commission, especially from KCTU, was critical for making 
the government compromise to limiting fixed-term employment to two years and outlawing discrim-
ination based on employment status, though the legislation did not materialise before 2008.109  
The innovations of the legislation on irregular employment were followed by two conservative 
governments (until 2017) with a comprehensive deregulation agenda, including the deregulation of 
atypical employment (e.g. allowing four years of fixed-term employment). This met fierce opposition 
from unions and civil society groups, which were able to block attempts by these governments to 
deregulate the labour market, especially through unions’ involvement in the Tripartite Commission 
where the government sought to achieve consensual labour market reforms. At the same time, how-
ever, unions and civil society (in a rather hostile political environment) were obviously not in a position 
to achieve any better protection of irregular workers with the conservative governments taking ex-
tremely business-friendly positions.110 Despite no social progress, this episode (that is, the prevention 
of further deregulation) suggests that organised labour has developed into a de-facto veto player in 
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labour market reform, even during the rule of the political right with little meaningful access to polit-
ical decision-makers.111 
In May 2017, following the impeachment of the conservative President, the centre-left took 
control of government, with an agenda of social modernisation; and tackling social inequality associ-
ated with the rise in irregular employment was identified as a political priority.112 Whilst out of power, 
the centre-left party endeavoured to build stronger links with organised labour to consolidate its sup-
port base; and unions also sought to firm up ties with the centre-left, as exemplified by a high-profile 
event in 2012 when around a thousand trade union members (including a former president of KCTU 
and other prominent leaders) joined the party.113 Labour activists were heavily involved in the centre-
left President’s election campaign, with former senior union leaders from KCTU and FKTU filling im-
portant positions in the candidate’s labour policy committee and the President’s transition team after 
the election. Not only have unions shaped the President’s labour market policy agenda, but we also 
find labour activists in key government positions, most notably the minister of labour and the presi-
dent of the Tripartite Commission (a minister-level appointment).114 After the election, the new Pres-
ident presented a five-year plan of government priorities; including further limiting irregular employ-
ment, introducing stricter non-discrimination measures, reducing irregular employment by creating 
decent jobs, and converting irregular workers in the public sector into standard workers.115 Whilst the 
previous, right-wing governments took great advantage of the deregulated labour market, not only is 
the new government set to present a best-practice example as an employer, it also puts increasing 
pressure on private employers to convert irregular to regular jobs. The conservative governments’ 
weak enforcement of labour laws has already been reversed with the ministry of labour pursuing pros-
ecution and heavy fines of non-compliant businesses.116 In light of these recent developments, it is 
not surprising that the new government is widely considered “pro-labour” reflecting trade unions’ 
growing influence on public policy, whereas business expresses strong discontent, claiming “govern-
ment only listens to unions”.117  
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Obviously, union action does not fit the producer coalition argument, although some union 
behaviour might still be read as not challenging the insider/outsider model. Yet, when contextualising 
union behaviour, we find strong support for genuine concerns for irregular workers, and the emer-
gence of the Alliance for Non-Standard Workers, combing union and civil society forces, provides 
strong support for the argument of social (movement) unionism transforming Korean organised la-
bour and pushing back long-established business unionism. The identity of KCTU’s leadership as a so-
cial movement (that is, striving for social justice and social progress for all) was critical for overcoming 
narrow insider interest representation, and the progressive leadership used the “window of oppor-
tunity” for innovation and revitalisation that the East Asian financial crisis and the subsequent social 
crisis of dualisation provided. In the new socio-economic environment, the limits of old union strate-
gies became increasingly obvious, in addition to the crises putting unions under enormous public pres-
sure to display greater responsiveness to dualisation and the poor conditions of irregular workers. We 
thus find proactive trade unions that display capacity to innovate with a view on current and future 
strategic capacity challenging the depiction of unions that cannot overcome narrow insider interests. 
The sequencing in the Korean case (that is, the initial prioritisation of social protection in union mod-
ernisation) can be interpreted in terms of institutional capacity. The historical dominance of enterprise 
unions in Korean industrial relations and the weakness of labour federations did, at first, not allow 
union modernisation at the workplace level. However, social concertation to cope with the East Asian 
financial crisis gave union federations a strong voice in labour market and social policy-making, which 
union leadership used for social policy modernisation. After labour market deregulation, irregular em-
ployment increased massively with a huge impact in Korean workplaces. Slowly, enterprise unions 
started to “wake up” to the far-reaching changes in the Korean labour market, translating into chang-
ing union behaviour in many workplaces. In other words, we have started to observe modernisation 
in the industrial relations dimension as well; and more recently with the election of a centre-left gov-
ernment, unions have gained possibly unprecedented influence in public policy that could be inter-
preted as a result of organised labour’s strategic re-orientation.   
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Conclusions 
There is no doubt that labour market dualisation put organised labour under pressure. But far from 
simply turning inwards, trade unions in Italy and Korea displayed the capacity to overcome their strong 
insider orientation, and opened up their organisations to labour market outsiders, despite coming 
from very different historical models of unionism, each presenting rather high barriers to the pursuit 
of “social solidarity for all”. In both the industrial relations and public policy domains, unions devel-
oped greater inclusiveness overcoming their narrow conceptions of solidarity restricted to the work-
place. Labour market dualisation made historically established organising models and industrial strat-
egies ever less feasible with the decline of standard employment. In Italy, unions with class identity 
and a moral claim to represent the entire working class could no longer ignore labour market outsiders, 
who saw massive increases after labour market deregulation. In correspondence with Italian class un-
ionism, greater inclusiveness focussed, at first, on the workplace; and unions effectively extended 
their established industrial strategies towards outsiders. But as the economic crisis contributed to an 
ever-growing periphery of the labour market, unions acknowledged the limits of an inclusive strategy 
focussed on the industrial relations dimension; and they started ascribing greater prominence to uni-
versalistic social protection policies. Here, it is also important to note the increasing political margin-
alisation of unions actively pursued by successive governments, including – critically – the centre-left. 
The turning towards civil society with the Alliance against Poverty might thus be considered a sensible 
response towards the increasingly “cold climate” between the political left and organised labour. 
Whilst our observation of greater inclusiveness challenges the new political economy mainstream, the 
increasing distance between political left and labour also presents a problem for traditional political 
economy research rooted in the power resources model, assuming a “natural” alliance between social 
democracy and trade unions.  
 Developments in Korea, despite much higher barriers towards change, display great similarity, 
but we observe inverse sequencing that is associated with differences in industrial relations regime, 
highlighting the importance of institutional structures shaping behavioural changes and strategies. 
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The predominance of “exclusive” business unionism did, at first, not allow for innovations in the work-
place, even though progressive union leaders had long acknowledged problems with Korean enter-
prise unionism. But the KCTU leadership was able to use the East Asian financial crisis innovatively to 
champion the social rights of outsiders (most notably, improved unemployment protection), and pub-
lic pressure made the more conservative FKTU follow the lead of their left competitors. Also, a massive 
drop in union membership since early democratisation (exceeding the long-term secular decline in 
Italy) added to a sense of an existential crisis. In this context, the attempt of corporatist concertation 
to cope with the East Asian financial crisis provided union leaders with a window of opportunity to 
“reinvent” the movement – though this triggered massive discontent with enterprise unions. The 
scene changed in the aftermath of labour market deregulation. On the one hand, the massive growth 
in irregular workers gradually undermined the conditions of insiders, and for this reason company 
unions, which had previously looked somewhat favourably at “cheap” outsiders in correspondence 
with the producer coalition approach, became increasingly engaged in negotiating on behalf of irreg-
ular workers in order to prevent further growth in the gap between insiders and outsiders.  Thus, to 
some extent, the interest of outsiders and insider started overlapping, which allowed greater inclu-
siveness at the workplace level – though with limits. This is recognised by union leaders, which have 
started to push for industrial union in order to overcome the inherit faults of Korean enterprise un-
ionism. On the other hand, as in the Italian case, Korean unions faced increasing political marginalisa-
tion with rather business-friendly governments, including the second centre-left government as far as 
labour market policy was concerned. In this context, unions joined forces with civil society organisa-
tions to promote the labour and social rights of irregular workers. Thus, as in Italy, Korean unions 
started to embrace more inclusive social unionism including deeper cooperation with civil society, and 
this allowed for weakening though admittedly not abandoning business unionism and associated in-
sider orientation in parts of the union movement, especially in some powerful chaebol unions.  
 However, regardless of some “legacy effects”, it is remarkable, especially if considering the 
“mainstream” of insider/outsider and producer coalition theories, how unions in two most-different 
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industrial relations systems reflected upon institutional weaknesses and the political context, and then 
made deliberate efforts to increase the inclusiveness of organised labour and turned towards civil 
society in order to regain social force and legitimisation. This shows that dualisation is not a stable 
equilibrium, but it needs to be considered a powerful mechanism that has the capacity to alter the 
preferences and strategies of key political and economic agency.118 In Italy and Korea, the rise of social 
unionism and the associated politicisation of unions that in the past focussed on the workplace was 
critical for overcoming narrow industrial strategies and making better social policy a trade union pri-
ority – that is moving from workplace solidarity towards social solidarity. Intriguingly, with some sig-
nificant “delay” though, we appear to observe similar developments in Germany, where unions (also 
facing a hollowing-out of the core, fierce low-wage competition and a public that views dualisation 
and inequality rather critically) have turned towards greater outsider inclusiveness with the recent 
introduction of a minimum wage and an increasingly critical stance towards temporary agency 
work.119 Despite greater social solidarity, this is not to argue that problems do not persist. On the 
contrary, dualisation and social inequality are still massive social problems in Italy and Korea, as else-
where; and unions are still in the process of consolidating their new industrial and political strategies. 
But this should not deflect from organised labour’s capacity to innovate and respond strategically to 
socio-economic and socio-political challenges; and, in Korea, with the recent election of a progressive 
centre-left government that was greatly shaped by unions’ and civil society’s agenda-setting, a win-
dow of opportunity might have opened for substantial social reform.   
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